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The psychological dynamics of modern Russian society:
an expert estimate
Andrej V. Yurevich, Dmitrij V. Ushakov
Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
Over the past several years, the possibilities for Russia’s economic growth have been 
discussed widely. This problem is unquestionably topical. However, do material factors 
alone determine the well-being of a society and its people? Since the mid-1980s, the 
overwhel  ming majority of indicators of the psychological state of Russian society have 
been demonst  rating a negative tendency, and this trend not only reflects on the citizens’ 
sense of self but also creates obstacles on the way to the country’s innovative develop-
ment.
Keywords: modern Russian society, psychological state, social processes, society develop-
ment, expert assessment
The methodology of modern social science and the humanities increasingly often 
employs social indicators based on aggregated quantitative assessments of differ-
ent societal characteristics. The term social indicators was first used in the United 
States in the early 1960s. It was introduced on the initiative of the American Aca-
demy of Arts and Sciences, which was doing research for the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration. In the 1970s, the U.S. government regularly published 
relevant data, and the Social Indicators Research journal was launched. Internatio-
nal organizations undertook a similar approach. Interest in these data somewhat 
dropped in the 1980s but revived in the 1990s as a consequence of the adoption of 
the Sustainable Development Program by the international community; the pro-
gram required the use of composite, rather than miscellaneous, social indicators, 
which would include different components of the indices (Stepashin, 2008). Social 
indicators are actively used by authoritative international organizations, such as 
the United Nations, the Statistical Office of the European Union, the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Bank, and the European 
Commission, and are applied by almost all European countries, as well as by the 
United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, Latin American countries, and the Repub-
lic of South Africa.
Psychological components occupy an important place in the structure of social 
indicators. According to Osipov (2011), “The traditional approach was supplemen-22    A. V. Yurevich, D. V. Ushakov
ted by the subjective one, which accounts for the psychological well-being of people; 
the concepts of life quality and functional abilities were formed” (p. 6). The indices 
of social moods, social health, social optimism, satisfaction with life, and others, 
which are calculated by sociologists, have a pronounced psychological component. 
Note that the primary components of these indices are also “psychologized” to a 
considerable extent. For example, the index of satisfaction with life, suggested by 
Balatskii (2005), includes creative self-realization and effective informal social con-
tacts (friendship, communication, mutual understanding, sexual relations, and so 
on) as primary indicators. Other indices, such as, for example, a country’s vitality 
coefficient, used by demographers (Sulakshin, 2006), and indicators of quality of 
life and associated phenomena—subjective well-being and so on (Biderman, 1970; 
Keltner, Locke, & Audrian, 1993)—also directly relate to psychology. Such indices 
as the happy life index, the happy planet index, and the gross national happiness 
index (the latter coined by Bhutan’s fourth king and used in that country instead of 
the GDP index) make it possible to count the seemingly uncountable. These indi-
ces were generated in economic science, which, for example, developed happiness 
economics. In particular, “the dissatisfaction of economists with the explanatory 
potential of the profit maximization postulate led to posing the notion of well-be-
ing as the goal of economic activity, which replaced in this function the notion of 
wealth” (Osipov, 2011, p. 39). Well-being is usually understood as a state consisting 
of six factors: physical and psychological health, knowledge and understanding, 
work, material welfare, freedom and self-determination, and interpersonal rela-
tions (Lebedeva, 2000). One cannot but notice how deeply this notion, generated 
by economic science, is psychologized. Happiness economics largely inverts the 
traditional logic of economic and social assessments by shifting the focus to subjec-
tive well-being and assessing through it the quality of objective life conditions. It is 
believed that the main difference between “secondary” and “primary” moderniza-
tion is to improve the quality of life and to satisfy people’s needs for happiness and 
self-expression rather than merely to develop the economy to meet people’s mate-
rial requirements.
In psychological science itself, similar approaches are used for assessing the 
subjective quality of life; the psychological potential of a population (Zarakovskii, 
2009); and social capital, which, in essence, has a social-psychological content (Ta-
tarko, 2011). As G. M. Zarakovskii (2009) stresses, “Fundamentally important is 
the transfer from understanding the essence of the psychological potential of an 
individual to understanding the essence of the psychological potential of society” 
(p. 132).
The Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) has de-
veloped a composite index of the psychological state of society. The dynamics of 
the psychological state of modern Russia, elucidated on the basis of this index, 
have been considered earlier (Yurevich, 2009) and have been subjected to further 
analysis. These dynamics are shown in Figure 1.
In 2011, in the context of the typical social science—humanities orientation 
toward combining “rough” indices, which are calculated on the basis of statistical 
data, with poll results, the RAS Institute of Psychology conducted an expert survey 
targeted at elucidating the dynamics of the psychological state of our society. The 
experts were asked to assess these dynamics for 1981, 1991 (prior to the disinte-The psychological dynamics of modern Russian society: an expert estimate    23
gration of the Soviet Union), 2001, and 2011 in a questionnaire. The assessment 
was based on 70 parameters, including 35 positive and 35 negative characteristics 
of society, which were selected in preliminary consultations with the experts. Not 
all these characteristics were purely psychological. Each parameter was assessed 
on a 10-point scale, on which mark 1 corresponded to the minimal expression 
of a particular characteristic and mark 10, to the maximal. The experts were 124 
psychologists representing different regions and scientific-educational centers of 
our country and meeting the following requirements: age: an expert had to be able 
to assess the state of our society in 1981 (accordingly, young psychologists were 
not included); sufficiently high academic qualifications: a candidate’s or a doctoral 
degree; a professional area relevant to macropsychological problems; and relevant 
publications.
The results (Table 1, Figure 2) appear unexpected even accounting for the 
generally pessimistic state of modern Russian society, which, to all appearances, 
extends to the experts as well. If we compare the characteristics on the two ex-
treme points of the time continuum under consideration (1981 and 2011), we see 
that all negative parameters without exception grew, while the overwhelming ma-
jority of positive ones dropped. Only two positive parameters—rationalism and 
freedom—grew, but the positive dynamics appear ambiguous even in these two 
cases. Evidently, some of the respondents interpreted rationalism not as a positive 
characteristic of society but rather as a negative one that reflects its greediness and 
commercialism. The index of the level of freedom somewhat increased (0.4) owing 
to its spasmodic rise in 1991 (from 3.6 to 6.9) and subsequent drop.
The highest growth among negative characteristics was shown by aggressi  veness, 
greediness, anomie, expediency, audacity, animosity, permissiveness, rudeness, cru-
figure 1.  The dynamics of the composite index of the psychological state of Russian society, 
1990—2010, points
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table 1.  The dynamics of the psychological characteristics of Russian society at 10-year in-
tervals from 1981 to 2011, points 
Characteristics  of  the 
psy  chological atmosp-
he  re  of  Russian  soci-
ety
Value of the characteristics in 
points (1— min., 10 — max.)
Value 
change for 
the period 
2011/1981
Value 
change for 
the period 
1991/1981
1981  1991  2001  2011 
1. Aggressiveness  3.30 5.45 6.55 7.23   3.93***   2.15*
2. Greediness  3.07 4.94 7.19 8.29   5.22***   1.87**
3. Altruism 5.97 5.48 3.32 2.61 –3.36*** –0.49
4. Anomie 4.28 4.73 6.23 6.90   2.62***   0.45
5. Apathy 6.13 3.23 5.35 7.10   0.97  –2.90***
6. Irresponsibility 4.93 5.4 6.43 6.63   1.70   0.47
7. Lack of ideology  4.90 3.97 6.23 7.03   2.13* –0.93
8. Unselfishness 6.30 5.29 3.16 2.32 –3.98*** –1.01
9. Lawlessness 6.03 5.19 6.81 7.55   1.52 –0.84
10. Expediency 4.67 4.77 7.03 7.74   3.07***   0.10
11. Audacity  4.33 5.77 7.06 7.42   3.09***   1.44*
12. Mutual help  6.53 6.42 4.19 3.35 –3.18*** –0.11
13. Mutual understanding 6.43 5.87 4.26 3.71 –2.72*** –0.56
14. Mutual respect 5.83 5.19 3.71 3.06 –2.77*** –0.64
15. Animosity 3.23 5.26 6.42 7.26   4.03***   2.03**
16. Permissiveness 2.50 6.23 7.06 6.77   4.27***   3.73***
17. Rudeness 4.27 5.06 6.71 7.19   2.92***   0.79
18. Discipline 6.40 4.16 4.23 4.13 –2.27** –2.24**
19. Conscientiousness 5.47 4.52 3.65 3.16 –2.31*** –0.95
20. Kindness 6.30 5.19 3.81 3.23 –3.07*** –1.11
21. Confidence 6.33 5.74 3.71 2.81 –3.52*** –0.59
22. Cruelty  3.63 5.45 6.74 7.48   3.85***   1.82*
23. Law-abidingness  6.27 4.32 3.55 3.39 –2.88*** –1.95**
24. Hostility 3.13 4.97 6.03 6.71   3.58***   1.84**
25. Intellectualism  6.73 6.32 4.19 3.48 –3.25*** –0.41
26. Delicateness  6.28 5.40 3.30 2.73 –3.55*** –0.88
27. Sincerity  5.37 6.13 4.10 3.13 –2.24**   0.76
28. Proneness to conflict  3.77 6.10 6.71 6.97   3.2***   2.33**
29. Creativity  5.60 6.39 5.16 4.26 –1.34   0.79
30. Xenophobia 3.20 4.10 6.35 7.32   4.12***   0.90
31. Refined behavior 6.77 5.71 4.00 3.48 –3.29*** –1.06
32. Mendacity  5.87 4.97 6.32 7.19   1.32 –0.90
33. Mafia-style behavior 3.40 5.81 7.84 8.00   4.6***   2.41**
34. Commercialism 3.53 4.52 7.29 8.32   4.79***   0.99
35. Courage  5.30 5.97 4.52 3.94 –1.36   0.67
36. Impudence  3.43 5.35 7.00 7.65   4.22***   1.92*The psychological dynamics of modern Russian society: an expert estimate    25
Characteristics  of  the 
psy  chological atmosp-
he  re  of  Russian  soci-
ety
Value of the characteristics in 
points (1— min., 10 — max.)
Value 
change for 
the period 
2011/1981
Value 
change for 
the period 
1991/1981
1981  1991  2001  2011 
37. Reliability 6.45 4.87 3.53 3.03 –3.42*** –1.58*
38. Tension  3.13 6.77 6.23 6.77   3.64***   3.64***
39. Violence  3.27 5.58 6.87 7.29   4.02*** 2.31**
40. Bad manners 4.23 5.19 6.74 7.16   2.93***   0.96
41. Hatred  2.97 5.06 6.00 6.90   3.93***   2.09*
42. Lack of cooperation 4.47 5.68 6.29 6.81   2.34**   1.21
43. Good morals 6.21 5.33 3.73 3.03 –3.18*** –0.88
44. Optimism  5.27 6.9 4.52 3.16 –2.11**   1.63**
45. Responsiveness 6.33 5.71 3.90 3.03 –3.3*** –0.62
46. Patriotism 6.83 5.97 3.87 3.29 –3.54*** –0.86
47. Meanness 3.66 4.60 6.23 6.53   2.87***   0.94
48. Suspiciousness 4.10 4.40 5.60 6.10   2.0*   0.3
49. Decency 6.14 4.90 3.73 2.93 –3.21*** –1.24
50. Psychological safety 6.53 4.35 3.61 2.61 –3.92*** –2.18**
51. Excessive talkativeness 7.27 6.9 6.81 7.68   0.41 –0.37
52. Brashness 3.77 5.68 6.23 6.42   2.65**   1.91*
53. Rationalism  4.30 4.29 5.03 5.71   1.41* –0.01
54. Self-control  5.45 3.97 4.13 4.40 –1.05 –1.48*
55. Freedom 3.60 6.90 4.97 4.00   0.40   3.3***
56. Ribald language 4.03 5.37 6.77 7.33   3.3***   1.34
57. Modesty 6.55 4.63 3.27 2.70 –3.85*** –1.92*
58. Sympathy 6.57 5.52 3.90 3.13 –3.44*** –1.05*
59. Calmness 6.93 3.61 3.52 3.35 –3.58*** –3.32***
60. Justice  4.37 4.19 2.77 2.45 –1.92* –0.18
61. Fear 3.17 5.48 6.03 6.42   3.25**   2.31*
62. Tactfulness 5.38 4.03 3.27 2.77 –2.61*** –1.35*
63. Anxiety  3.50 6.13 6.32 6.94   3.44***   2.63**
64. Diligence 5.90 4.81 4.10 3.68 –2.22** –1.09
65. Familiarity  3.45 5.4 5.87 5.83   2.38***   1.95***
66. Boorishness 4.21 5.67 6.70 7.07   2.86**   1.46
67. Civility 5.47 4.68 4.13 4.13 –1.34 –0.79
68. Humaneness 6.66 5.47 3.83 3.20 –3.46*** –1.19*
69. Honesty  5.67 4.94 3.61 3.06 –2.61*** –0.73
70. Selfishness 4.17 5.16 7.23 8.03   3.86***   0.99
Note. p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 26    A. V. Yurevich, D. V. Ushakov
elty, hostility, proneness to conflict, xenophobia, mendacity, mafia-style behavior, 
commercialism,  impudence,  tension,  violence,  bad  manners,  hatred,  mean  ness, 
  ribald language, anxiety, familiarity, and selfishness. Note that greediness (5.22), 
commercialism (4.79), and mafia-style behavior (4.6) had the highest growth.
In absolute values, the following negative characteristics of our society stand 
out: aggressiveness, greediness, apathy, the lack of ideology, lawlessness, expedien-
cy, audacity, animosity, rudeness, cruelty, xenophobia, mendacity, mafia-style be-
havior, commercialism, impudence, violence, bad manners, excessive talkativeness, 
ribald language, boorishness, and selfishness; those with the highest expression are 
commercialism (8.32), greediness (8.29), and selfishness (8.03).
The most significant losses among positive characteristics are observed in al-
truism, unselfishness, mutual help, mutual understanding, mutual respect, consci-
entiousness, kindness, confidence, law-abidingness, intellectualism, delicateness, 
refined behavior, reliability, good morals, patriotism, decency, psychological safety, 
modesty, sympathy, calmness, tactfulness, honesty, and humaneness. The most sig-
nificant difference between the values of 1981 and 2011 is observed in unselfishness 
(3.98), psychological safety (3.92), and modesty (3.85). The experts assessed only 
one positive parameter higher than the average level (5.7), but, as was mentioned, 
this parameter (rationalism) was, most likely, perceived ambiguously and was not 
interpreted as an unquestionably positive characteristic. True, some positive pa-
rameters were assessed close to the average level: discipline (4.13), creativity (4.26), 
self-control (4.4), freedom (4.0), and civility (4.13). For a number of characteristics, 
changes in the psychological state of Russian society were assessed by the experts 
figure 2.  Aggregate dynamics of the positive and negative psychological characteristics of 
Russian society at 10-year intervals from 1981 to 2011, points
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as linear, mainly as a gradual deterioration from 1981 to 1991 and then to 2001 
and 2011 (naturally, this does not exclude nonlinearity within respective 10-year 
intervals). Some characteristics, such as apathy, the lack of ideology, lawlessness, 
permissiveness, discipline, sincerity, creativity, mendacity, tension, courage, opti-
mism, excessive talkativeness, rationalism, self-control, freedom, and familiarity, 
showed nonlinear dynamics. In the majority of such cases, the common picture of 
nonlinear changes in the characteristics included their improvement from 1981 to 
1991 and subsequent deterioration. This trajectory corresponds to one of the main 
ways of perceiving the situation in Russian society: in 1991, our compatriots had 
hopes that later proved to be unjustified; as a result, the situation in 1991, despite 
its objective deplorableness (the lack of control over the country, clear signs of its 
nearing disintegration, the considerable deficit of staple commodities, and so on), 
appeared better than in it did in 2001 and 2011. In particular, in the opinion of the 
respondents, in 1991 we were less apathetic, lawless, and mendacious and more 
sincere, creative, courageous, optimistic, ideological, and free than in the preceding 
and subsequent periods.
At the same time, a number of characteristics, although their changes are non-
linear, do not comply with the “nostalgia for 1991.” For example, the level of disci-
pline dropped from 1981 through 1991, then it somewhat increased by 2001 and 
then slightly decreased again. Tension was characterized as maximal in 1991, which 
is natural for the threshold of subsequent events; later it somewhat decreased but 
increased again by 2011 and reached the 1991 level. The level of excessive talkative-
ness was assessed as gradually decreasing from 1981 to 2001; however, by 2011 it 
had increased again and surpassed the 1981 level. The expression of self-control 
and rationalism had dropped by 1991 but then increased stage by stage. The civility 
of our society was assessed by the experts as consistently decreasing from 1981 to 
2001 and then being “frozen” at quite a low level.
Factor analysis of the obtained data has elucidated four main factors that ex-
plain the dynamics of the positive characteristics of our society, namely amiabil-
ity (explained variance is 22.9%), self-organization (18.7%), intellectual potential 
(17.8%), and passion (13%), and four factors that explain the dynamics of its nega-
tive characteristics, namely severity (31.9%), antisocial disposition (16.8%), lack of 
self-control (10.8%), and suffering (10.3%).
It makes sense to consider the obtained data from the point of view of the tradi-
tional question about what the country has lost (in the psychological context). The 
answer depends on the period in the history of our country to which we attribute 
this question: to the more or less quiet “epoch of stagnation” or to the much more 
turbulent years of disintegration. On the basis of the overwhelming majority of posi-
tive characteristics, the assessment of Soviet society in 1981 is higher than average, 
while on the basis of the larger part of negative characteristics, the assessment is 
lower than average; in other words, the experts picture the society of that period as 
chiefly psychologically safe. At the same time, notwithstanding its basically safe na-
ture, it is assessed as rather apathetic, lawless, restricted, unjust, irrational, and prone 
to excessive talkativeness. Our society of 1981 appears positive primarily because 
many negative characteristics (such as greediness, commercialism, permissiveness, 
aggressiveness, hostility, cruelty, proneness to conflict, xenophobia, mafia-style be-
havior, impudence, hatred, tension, meanness, brashness, familiarity, animosity, vio-28    A. V. Yurevich, D. V. Ushakov
lence, anxiety, and fear) were expressed relatively infrequently. In total, our society 
of that time may be characterized as kind, calm, and uncommercial.
As for the psychological state of society in 1991, it appears transitional, from 
“kind” to “hostile.” Compared with the society of 1981, its positive characteristics 
largely  acquire  lower  values,  while  the  negative  ones  become  higher.  Overall, 
parameters of both types show average values, from 4 to 5; more radical assessments 
are  rare.  Thus,  psychologically,  Russian  society  is  not  characterized  as  “kind” 
compared with 1981, but it is not characterized as “hostile” either if we compare 
it with later periods. The most expressed negative shifts compared with 1981 are 
observed in tension, calmness, permissiveness, and familiarity. At the same time, a 
number of parameters (apathy, a lack of ideology, lawlessness, sincerity, creativity, 
menda  city,  excessive  talkativeness,  courage,  optimism,  and  freedom)  show 
improvement. Our society in 1991, compared with its state in 1981, is characterized 
as more crea  tive, freer, and more optimistic, findings that need no commentary. In 
the context of the comparison between 1981 and 1991, as drawn by the experts, 
note that the 1991 results relate to the prereform period. When viewed as an 
expression of objective reality, the expert assessments refute the popular notion 
that the radical deterioration of the psychological atmosphere in Russia was the 
result of the reforms, which are conventionally measured starting from 1991. In 
the opinion of the experts, cardinal psychological changes took place prior to the 
beginning of the reforms (although they continued later) and were the product 
of the sociopolitical, economic, and macropsychological processes that began to 
develop earlier than the 1990s. Indeed, obvious symptoms of the beginning of the 
country’s disintegration, the aggravation of interethnic relations, criminalization 
and the legalization of criminal relations, the degradation of morale, and the rise 
of a new type of personality oriented to money and earning it by any means were 
evident already in the late 1980s, and the reforms of the early 1990s were actively 
supported by the population because they were perceived as a way to overcome this 
situation. Also, a significant rise in the feeling of freedom took place by 1991—that 
is, under Soviet power; later it began to wither.
In this context, it is useful to remember the suggestion of many famous sociolo-
gists (for example, Kimmel, 1990) that, contrary to Marxist logic, revolutions and 
other radical social reforms are reactions to reforms of the preceding period gone 
awry rather than to the absence of changes (“stagnations” of various types). At the 
same time, it is necessary to take into account that society always has a choice at 
such bifurcation points. Although the ideologists of domestic reforms, particularly 
Gaidar (2007), stressed time and again that our country had no choice in 1991 and 
that their actions were the only ones possible, it seems to us that in reality there 
were other, positive, options; later these options were recognized even by foreign 
adherents of radical market reforms, such as M. Friedman.
A similar vector of psychological changes in Russian society was noted by other 
researchers, including sociologists, who have been showing more and more inter-
est in social-psychological characteristics, a development that is noteworthy. For 
example, in 2005, the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) posed 
the following question to its respondents: “How, in your opinion, have the quali-
ties of people who surround you changed over the past 10 to 15 years?” In the 
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grew in our citizens, while unselfishness, patriotism, loyalty to comrades, ami-
ability, warmheartedness, mutual confidence, honesty, and sincerity significantly 
decreased (VCIOM, 2005). In still another poll, the question “Do you think that 
you can trust the majority of people?” was answered in the affirmative by 34.7% of 
Russians in 1990, by 22.9% in 1999, and by approximately the same percentage in 
the 2000s (Yurevich, 2009). In fact, the level of interpersonal confidence decreased 
in the 1990s and then remained almost unchanged at quite a low level; this decrease 
was accompanied by a low level of trust in social institutions.
Similar changes have occurred in the value systems of our compatriots. Based 
on their study, Sochivko and Polyanin characterize the social—psychological at-
mosphere in modern Russia in the following way (2009, p. 183):
Our country is in the state that Durkheim termed “anomie,” which explains 
the emergence of many of today’s social problems, such as the crisis of moral and 
legal consciousness, social instability, political disorientation and demoralization 
of the population, the fall in the value of human life and the loss of its meaning, an 
existential vacuum, cynicism, and value and legal nihilism. As a consequence, we 
observe the growth of aggressive and criminal tendencies, progressing alienation, 
high anxiety, and the deformation of legal consciousness among the young.
There are significant differences between the value systems of different social 
groups, primarily between the young—children of the 1990s and 2000s, whose per-
sonalities were formed in those years—and the “Soviet” generations. (No doubt, 
the conflict of generations in one form or another exists in every society, but its ex-
treme forms are also a symptom of a society’s psychological ill-being.) For example, 
a study by Lebedeva (2002) shows that the priority values for modern Russian col-
lege students are independence, self-respect, freedom, obtaining success, and an 
independent choice of goals, while their professors place a priority on responsibil-
ity, social and national order, global peace, honesty, and respect for senior citizens. 
Large differences between the value systems of the generations were also detected 
by other authors (Magun & Rudnev, 2012; Zarakovskii, 2009). The contemporary 
young generation is forming its own moral code, within which aggressiveness, for 
example, is a positive quality, while impudence, swagger, and permissiveness are 
united under the positive notion of “relaxedness.” However, it is difficult to find 
an objection to the statement “like society, like the young” (Sochivko & Polyanin, 
2009, p. 200), as well as to the assertion that “it is impossible to hope for an effective 
cultural self-realization of the young generation in an ill society” (p. 202).
The interpretation of our data centers around two fundamental possibilities 
(and their combination). The first is to consider that the dynamics of Russia’s psy-
chological state are objectively presented by the expert psychologists. In this case, 
one has to recognize that these dynamics are overall negative: the psychological 
state of modern Russian society is highly unsatisfactory; our society is largely ag-
gressive, apathetic, lacking convictions, lawless, unprincipled, presumptuous, un-
friendly, rude, cruel, xenophobic, mendacious, impudent, prone to violence, ill 
mannered, prone to talking excessively, foul-mouthed, and boorish; and the most 
pronounced negative characteristics of modern Russian society are greediness, 
commercialism, and egoism. Naturally, one should express the reservation that 
even if we recognize the impartiality of this characteristic, “society as a whole” is 
an abstraction, and the elucidated picture is of a generalized nature and does not 30    A. V. Yurevich, D. V. Ushakov
account for the differences among individuals and among various social groups 
that constitute any real society.
The second fundamental possibility for interpreting the obtained data is to 
consider the factors that may have shifted the expert assessment toward a nega-
tive perception. However, not all psychological effects that can influence expert 
assessments (nostalgia and so on) necessarily act in this direction. For example, the 
well-being of many respondents in 2011 was surely higher than in 1981 and 1991, 
and they enjoyed attributes of well-being (apartments, cars, dachas, and so on) that 
they had lacked before. As a result, the effects of conjoining psychological and so-
cioeconomic assessments and attributing a general sense to the personal situation 
can lead to an optimistic rather than a negative picture of events.
Projecting the personal to the general unquestionably takes place. For example, 
many, if not all, respondents happened to be the targets of boorishness, aggression, 
lack of conscientiousness, and other negative phenomena, and they projected their 
personal experience onto their estimation of the society. However, there was no 
guarantee against such events in Soviet times either, and having general assess-
ments proceed from personal experience is quite an objective way of forming them. 
True, we may assume that a recent negative experience has a stronger influence 
on such assessments than do distant experiences (30, 20, 10 years ago); however, 
it is difficult to explain in this case why recent positive experiences have no simi-
lar effect. Possibly, the assessment in this case is similar to that made of previous 
changes by some journalists and public figures: “Life has become objectively better 
but more disgusting.” Maybe, sensibility to and requirements for the psychological 
atmosphere in society grow as material needs are satisfied. We should also bear in 
mind that, as the educational level grows, satisfaction with different aspects of sub-
jective well-being usually drops, while criticism increases (Osipov, 2011).
Such suppositions confirm the following well-known fact: when basic material 
needs are not satisfied, people focus just on those needs, and psychological prob-
lems are pushed into the background. However, when the material requirements of 
the larger part of the population are overall satisfied, social and psychological, rath-
er than economic, problems come to the fore; this explanation organically complies 
with A. Maslow’s theory of motivation and Deci and Ryan’s theories of needs (Deci 
& Ryan, 2000), which are based on analogous logic. In this situation, the deficit of 
life strategies (in particular, the absence of a distinct national idea) in the majority 
of the population, which may lead to mass dissatisfaction, gains great importance.
Zarakovskii (2009) is of the opinion that “the quality of life depends more on 
the presence of personality growth and life meaning than on the satisfaction of 
basic needs” (p. 105). On the basis of quantitative analysis, he formulates the fol-
lowing conclusion (p. 110):
The largest contribution to the generalized index of satisfaction with life is made 
not  by  “material”  but  rather  by  “psychophysiological”  factors  (family  relations, 
friendship, communication, personal and family safety, and personal and family 
members’ health). The least contribution is made by the following factors: the eco-
nomic and political situation in the country, creative self-realization in the work-
place and outside of it, the social infrastructure, and the environmental situation.
Very topical also is Zarakovskii’s observation that, from the late 1990s to the 
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gestive-tract disorders) in our country increased significantly. The author explains 
this phenomenon by citing two possibilities: the increase was caused either by a 
discrepancy in adaptation to the situation at the conscious and unconscious levels 
or by the psychophysiological costs of an increasingly active lifestyle (particularly 
multiple employment), caused by the necessity of adapting to new economic condi-
tions.
In this context, studies that demonstrate the absence of a direct connection 
between the quantitatively measured level of happiness and the subjective quality 
of life, on the one hand, and material well-being, on the other, are noteworthy. Ac-
cording to data from a Swedish company, World Values Survey, the top places with 
regard to the subjective quality of life are Venezuela and Nigeria, while rich West-
ern countries are far behind (Stepashin, 2008). The majority of developed countries 
have very low indicators; for example, on the happy planet index, the G8 members 
are distributed in the following way: Italy occupies the 66th place in the world; Ger-
many, the 81st; Japan, the 95th; Great Britain, the 108th; Canada, the 111th; France, 
the 129th; the United States, the 150th; and Russia, the 172nd (Marks, Aballah, 
Simms, & Thompson, 2006).
Similar data were obtained by other surveys, which registered a paradoxical 
connection between the objective and the subjective quality of life (Diener & Suh, 
1999). Well known are the Easterlin paradox and other similar phenomena that 
imply that subjective well-being is not proportional to the level of incomes because 
of the action of various mechanisms, such as, for example, the “hedonic circular 
chase” (in which growth of incomes is accompanied by growth in the level of de-
mands). For instance, the level of incomes of U.S. citizens after World War II grew 
continually, while the share of people who thought themselves happy constantly 
decreased (Blanchflower & Oswald, 2000). In all countries where the index of sus-
tainable economic welfare and the genuine progress indicator were measured, their 
values showed a nonlinear connection with GDP size; this finding gave rise to the 
so-called threshold hypothesis, which suggests that GDP and well-being grow in 
parallel up to a certain point, after which GDP growth is not accompanied by the 
growth of well-being (Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2008). In some countries, for ex-
ample, in Switzerland, an inverse connection between the size of incomes and the 
level of subjective well-being was observed.
All the above information does not mean either that the way to happiness for 
the Russian population is paved through its total impoverishment or that our coun-
try should focus on a noneconomic way to improve the welfare of its citizens. At 
the same time, accounting for subjective factors, first, forces us to an increasingly 
flexible understanding of the interrelationship between economic and psychologi-
cal indicators and, second, serves as another refutation of “economic determinism,” 
which was espoused by domestic reformers of the early 1990s, who were convinced 
that the main point was to improve the economy, and all the rest would follow of 
its own accord. The subsequent years of Russia’s development and the experience of 
other countries convincingly show the following:
Economic advance is not accompanied automatically by social, political, and 
spiritual progress. A high level of material welfare in society is often accompa-
nied by the growth of soullessness, immorality, and an increase in social devia-
tions. … Such categories as satisfaction with life, the quality of life, and the level of 32    A. V. Yurevich, D. V. Ushakov
  human potential development are multifactorial and are not directly GDP depen-
dent. (Osipov, 2011, p. 37) 
In generalizing the obtained data and similar results of other researchers, it is 
useful to remember that when society becomes freer, not only the best but also the 
worst qualities in society, as well as in individuals, are liberated; this fact is often 
forgotten by reformers conducting liberal (or pseudoliberal) reforms without due 
caution. To all appearances, this was the experience in our society as well: it became 
more hostile, impudent, and presumptuous and acquired the other above-men-
tioned negative psychological characteristics. Let us once more recall that society as 
a whole is an abstraction, and some of its representatives became hostile, impudent, 
and so on, while others did not. But for those who did not yield to the negative ten-
dencies, such changes in their environment led to a considerable deterioration of 
their psychological state (such as the loss of psychological safety). Strangely, how-
ever, our data show that some positive qualities that should seemingly have mani-
fested themselves as a consequence of liberalization waned. For example, according 
to the expert assessments, intellectuality and creativity, which, as the experience of 
other countries shows, are usually stimulated by a market economy, decreased in 
our society. At the same time, this result is not unexpected if we take into consider-
ation the specifics of the domestic version of the market economy, which was ori-
ented toward speculation and raw materials rather than toward innovation; such an 
orientation does not place high requirements on intellect and creativity (although 
its characteristic machinations, such as, for example, building financial pyramids, 
requires a specific kind of creativity). The decrease in the level of perceived free-
dom after 1991 is not sensational either: if freedom combines with boorishness, 
unfriendliness, and impudence, it transforms into the freedom of boorishness (in-
cluding the public use of ribald language), which has nothing to do with genuine, 
civilized freedom.
Even the possibility that the experts’ negative perception of the psychological 
state of Russian society was the result of the improvement of the economic situa-
tion in the country does not make the problem less topical but rather necessitates 
its being posed in another plane. We have to recognize that positive changes in the 
economy do not lead automatically to improvement in the psychological state of 
society. In addition, improvements in well-being and general stabilization may not 
serve as a substitute for psychological comfort and often increase our sensitivity to 
its absence. When the economic situation improves, psychological problems come 
to the fore; solving them should therefore become a priority of government policy.
However, our power structures pay almost no attention to the psychological 
state of society. In particular Zarakovskii (2009, p. 275) notes the following:
The current national projects and other measures undertaken by power insti-
tutions will hardly become effective enough because they do not rest on actions 
targeted at improving the psychological quality of the population despite the fact 
that speeches of the Russian president and the program of the ruling United Russia 
party devote much space to the human being as the main driving force of socioeco-
nomic development.
At the same time, it would be incorrect and unjust to place the blame on the au-
thorities alone without taking into account our own qualities, the degree to which 
we have endured the trials of freedom, and what exactly it liberated in us.The psychological dynamics of modern Russian society: an expert estimate    33
The outstanding Russian sociologist P. A. Sorokin, who emigrated from Russia 
to the United States in 1923, used to divide members of society into adherents of 
“creative altruism” and those who practiced aggressive egoism (Sorokin, 1992, p. 
198). Judging from the data presented in this and other works, Russia is moving 
toward aggressive egoism from the point of view of the prevailing value systems 
and the share of personalities of this type. This change not only causes annoyance 
but also creates serious obstacles, which are clearly understated by the strategists of 
our reforms, on the way toward an innovation economy; such an economy requi-
ries that creative, rather than aggressively money-grubbing, orientations should 
dominate in society. Hence, one of the main preconditions of Russia’s innovative 
development is a radical change in the psychological state of our society.
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